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Abstract
Background: A vaccine matched to a newly emerged pandemic influenza virus would require a production time of at
least 6 months with current proven techniques, and so could only be used reactively after the peak of the pandemic. A
pre-pandemic vaccine, although probably having lower efficacy, could be produced and used pre-emptively. While
several previous studies have investigated the cost effectiveness of pre-emptive vaccination strategies, they have not
been directly compared to realistic reactive vaccination strategies.
Methods: An individual-based simulation model of ~30,000 people was used to examine a pre-emptive vaccination
strategy, assuming vaccination conducted prior to a pandemic using a low-efficacy vaccine. A reactive vaccination
strategy, assuming a 6-month delay between pandemic emergence and availability of a high-efficacy vaccine, was
also modelled. Social distancing and antiviral interventions were examined in combination with these alternative
vaccination strategies. Moderate and severe pandemics were examined, based on estimates of transmissibility and
clinical severity of the 1957 and 1918 pandemics respectively, and the cost effectiveness of each strategy was evaluated.
Results: Provided that a pre-pandemic vaccine achieved at least 30% efficacy, pre-emptive vaccination strategies were
found to be more cost effective when compared to reactive vaccination strategies. Reactive vaccination coupled
with sustained social distancing and antiviral interventions was found to be as effective at saving lives as pre-emptive
vaccination coupled with limited duration social distancing and antiviral use, with both strategies saving approximately
420 life-years per 10,000 population for a moderate pandemic with a basic reproduction number of 1.9 and case fatality
rate of 0.25%. Reactive vaccination was however more costly due to larger productivity losses incurred by sustained
social distancing, costing $8 million per 10,000 population ($19,074/LYS) versus $6.8 million per 10,000 population
($15,897/LYS) for a pre-emptive vaccination strategy. Similar trends were observed for severe pandemics.
Conclusions: Compared to reactive vaccination, pre-emptive strategies would be more effective and more cost
effective, conditional on the pre-pandemic vaccine being able to achieve a certain level of coverage and efficacy.
Reactive vaccination strategies exist which are as effective at mortality reduction as pre-emptive strategies, though
they are less cost effective.
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Background
The threat of an influenza pandemic due to a novel virus
strain or subtype to which humans have little or no
immunity is a major public health concern. The last
four influenza pandemics have ranged in severity from
mild, having an estimated case fatality ratio (CFR) between
0.01% and 0.08% [1] as in the case of the 2009 pandemic,
to severe, having an estimated case fatality ratio between
0.74% and 1.8% [2-4] as in the case of the 1918 pandemic.
In recent years, avian influenza subtypes such as H5N1 and
H7N9 have begun circulating in domestic bird populations
in South-East Asia and China. These subtypes result in high
case fatality rates in humans who have contracted influenza
from infected birds, having an estimated CFR in patients
admitted to hospital of between 30% and 70% [5-10]. This
may lead to a major public health disaster if such a virus
mutates or reassorts into a form transmissible between
humans. Recent research studies highlighted the danger
of H5N1 mutation into a form readily transmissible
between mammal species, namely ferrets [11-13], dem-
onstrating potential transmissibility between humans.
Health authorities of many countries, often working with
the World Health Organisation (WHO), have established
pandemic mitigation plans that advocate the use of a range
of intervention strategies including social distancing,
neuraminidase inhibitor antiviral drugs, and vaccination
as the major defences against pandemic associated illness
and mortality.
Although vaccination is an effective and long-lasting
solution to the threat posed by a pandemic influenza
strain, the likely scenario, born out in the 2009 pan-
demic, is that a newly emerged influenza pandemic will
have spread to most parts of the world before a vaccine
matched to the pandemic subtype can be produced. A
high efficacy influenza vaccine matched to the circulating
pandemic strain could take at least 6 months from virus
isolation to final vaccine production with current proven
techniques [14].
In case of a highly transmissible and pathogenic pan-
demic, interventions that can be activated without
delay will be required to combat pandemic spread until
a matched vaccine can be developed. Modelling studies
have indicated that rigorously deployed social distancing
and antivirals measures could suppress pandemic spread
until a vaccine becomes available [15,16]. However the
social disruption and economic cost of maintaining these
measures for many months could be very large, and may
render them practically infeasible.
An alternative (or possibly complementary) intervention
measure is a pre-pandemic vaccine: a vaccine produced
from isolated influenza virus strains that are considered
most likely to emerge as pandemic strains potentially
lethal to humans. Such a vaccine could be developed
and used in anticipation of a pandemic, and would not
be subject to the development delay of a reactively de-
veloped vaccine. In recent years, the candidate H5N1
vaccines have been advocated for pre-emptive use to com-
bat against a potentially lethal pandemic that could cause
by H5N1 [17-27]. Modelling of pre-emptive vaccination
also suggested that pre-pandemic vaccines could mitigate
such pandemics [28-31].
Several modelling studies [16,28-35] have examined the
cost-effectiveness of the use of vaccination as a pandemic
influenza mitigation measure. Milne et al. [28] demon-
strated the mitigating effect of vaccination with pre-
pandemic H5N1 vaccines. Baguelin et al., Prosser et al.,
and Lugnér et al. [32,33,35] examined the economic
outcomes of various influenza vaccination strategies;
the studies of Lee et al., Newall et al., and Khazeni et al.
[30,31,34] included strategies involving antiviral drugs
as well as vaccination; while the studies of Andrasdóttir
et al. and Sander et al.[16,29] also included various
social distancing strategies in their analysis. Recently,
we have investigated the cost-effectiveness of reactive
vaccination taking into account the probable 6-month
delay in vaccine availability, with and without combined
social distancing and antiviral interventions [15]. The
economic outcomes and cost effectiveness analysis of
reactive vaccination in conjunction with social distancing
and antiviral drugs were also investigated in [16,35].
However, no previous study has explicitly addressed
the cost-effectiveness of pre-emptive vaccination strategy
in highly plausible scenarios where pre-emptive vaccin-
ation is compared to reactive vaccination with a 6-month
delay, and where both vaccination strategies are con-
sidered with and without rigorous social distancing
and antiviral use.
This modelling study addresses this knowledge gap
using an established individual-based simulation model
of a developed country [15,36-42] by simulating both
pre-emptive and reactive vaccination strategies, com-
bined with a range of social distancing and antiviral
measures, for plausible future pandemics with different
pandemic transmissibility and severity characteristics.
The costs to society of each strategy and pandemic sce-
nario stemming from medical treatment, pharmaceut-
ical costs and productivity losses are calculated with an
economical model, and the effectiveness of each strat-
egy is assessed in terms of Life Years Saved (LYS). This
work continues and completes a sequence of previous
studies by the authors on pandemic influenza vaccin-
ation: in [28] we assessed the potential effectiveness
of pre-pandemic vaccines, but did not address cost-
effectiveness or reactive vaccination strategies; while
in [15] we assessed the cost-effectiveness of reactive
vaccination strategies combined with plausible social
distancing and antiviral measures, but did not address
pre-pandemic vaccines.
Halder et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:266 Page 2 of 19
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/266
Methods
In this section we describe the simulation model and
economic analysis used in this study, its application to
pre-pandemic vaccination. Readers who are familiar with
individual-based epidemic spread modelling and cost-
effectiveness analysis, and the previous studies of the
authors in particular, may be most interested in the
“Pre-emptive vaccination” and “Vaccination scenarios”
subsections.
Simulation model
A detailed, individual-based simulation model of a com-
munity in Western Australia (Albany, population ~30,000)
was used to simulate the dynamics of an influenza pan-
demic, under various public health mitigation strategies,
and for pandemics of different transmissibility and severity
characteristics. Data produced by the model indicating the
infectious history of each individual in the community was
used to determine health outcomes of each individual,
considering symptomatic or asymptomatic infection, hos-
pitalisation, ICU treatment, and death. Together with
productivity losses due to illness and the interventions
themselves, these outcomes were used to estimate the cost
and cost effectiveness of alternative intervention strategies.
The Albany simulation model used in this study has
been used previously in a series of studies addressing
the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of various public
health pandemic influenza mitigation measures, includ-
ing the cost effectiveness of reactive vaccination strat-
egies with respect to the delay in vaccine development
[15], the economic evaluation and cost effectiveness
analysis of social distancing and antiviral drug strategies
that were used during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic [39],
combinations of antiviral and different social distancing
interventions for the future pandemics with mild,
moderate and severe characteristics [15,40,41], and the
effectiveness of vaccination with pre-pandemic H5N1
vaccines [28]. For the purposes of this study, a model of
pre-emptive vaccination was added which allows for
different levels of vaccine efficacy and coverage, and
includes the ongoing cost of vaccine development and
deployment required to keep pre-emptive vaccination
coverage current in the population. The model used in
the present study carries over all other assumptions
from previous studies that do not relate to pre-emptive
vaccination.
A full description of the model appears in Additional
file 1; model parameter values are summarised in Table
A1.1 of that file. An overview of methodology used for
the study is given in Figure 1, while Table 1 describes
the terminology used and the definition of pandemic
characteristics, together with the alternative vaccination,
antiviral and social distancing interventions analysed in
the study.
Figure 1 Synopsis of methodology.
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Pandemic characteristics
Two plausible pandemic scenarios (moderate and severe)
were defined based on the transmissibility and severity
characteristics of past pandemics. The transmissibility of a
pandemic was defined in terms of its basic reproduction
number R0 and associated illness attack rate. The severity
of a pandemic was defined in terms of the case fatality rate
(CFR).
In this study, a moderate pandemic was defined as
having a reproduction number R0 of 1.9 and a CFR of
0.25%. The reproduction number of the 1957 and 1968
pandemics has been estimated to be in the range 1.5 and
2.0 [43-45] with CFRs between 0.03% and 0.26% [2,3]. A
severe pandemic was defined with a reproduction num-
ber R0 of 2.7 and a CFR of 1.5%, to reflect the estimated
transmissibility and severity characteristics of the 1918
pandemic, thought to have had a reproduction number
between 2.0 and 2.9 [44,46-48] with an estimated CFR
between 0.74% and 1.8% [2-4].
A proposed pandemic severity index from the US
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) uses the CFR for
categorising pandemic severity [49]. Severity categories
were proposed from category 1, with a CFR < 0.1% to
category 5, with a CFR > =2.0%. Our modelled scenarios
fit into category 2 for moderate pandemics and category 4
for severe pandemics.
Pre-emptive vaccination
A two-dose pre-emptive vaccination strategy was consid-
ered, as trials of candidate pre-pandemic H5N1 vaccines
indicate the need for a two-dose regime to induce immun-
ity [17-27]. It was assumed that pre-emptive vaccination
would be an ongoing process and that the pre-pandemic
vaccine would be updated and the population re-vaccinated
every ten years (with additional vaccination in intervening
years at the population birth rate to maintain coverage).
This is to ensure that the pre-pandemic vaccine reflects the
influenza strains circulating in wildfowl and poultry
populations that give most concern from a zoonotic
perspective – at the current time these might be H5N1
and H7N9, for example. One possibility for delivery of
the pre-pandemic vaccine might be to include it as part
Table 1 Terminology and definition
Terminology Definition
Pandemic characteristics
Moderate pandemics A moderate pandemic is defined as a pandemic with a transmissibility of R = 1.9 and case fatality rate of 0.25%.
Severe pandemics An extreme pandemic is defined as a pandemic with a transmissibility of R = 2.7 and case fatality rate of 1.5%.
Vaccinations
Pre-emptive vaccination A two-dose pre-emptive vaccination strategy is considered assuming that individuals should be vaccinated with
pre-pandemic vaccine annually. This pre-pandemic vaccine should be updated in every 10 years and a pandemic
will emerge within a 30 year time frame.
Reactive vaccination A two-dose reactive vaccination strategy is considered assuming that individuals are naïve to the pandemic virus
and such reactive vaccines will be available after 6 months of the pandemic emergence.
Scenarios
Scenario 1 No pandemic occurs in the 30 year time frame and people have been pre-emptive vaccinated annually.
Scenario 2 A pandemic occurs in the 30 year time frame with a virus that does not match pre-pandemic vaccines i.e. vaccine
efficacy is 0%. Reactive vaccines will be developed and administrated.
Scenario 3 A pandemic occurs in the 30 year time frame with a virus that matches pre-emptive vaccines with vaccine efficacy
of 30%.
Scenario 4 A pandemic occurs in the 30 year time frame with a virus that matches pre-emptive vaccines with vaccine efficacy
of 75%.
Social distancing and antiviral interventions
Limited duration school
closure
School were closed for 8 weeks of time as follows: for a primary school the whole school was closed if 1 or more
cases were detected in the school; in a high school only the class members of the affected class were isolated
(sent home and isolated at home) if no more than 2 cases were diagnosed in a single class; however if there were
more than 2 cases diagnosed in the entire high school the school was closed.
Sustained school closure All schools were closed simultaneously after a pandemic emerges.
Community contact reduction Community contact reduction was modelled by assuming that on days when the intervention was in effect all




Antiviral drugs used for treatment and prophylaxis of household members (of a symptomatic case) were combined
with vaccination and social distancing interventions. It was assumed that 50% of symptomatic individuals would be
identified for antiviral treatment and/or prophylaxis, and that treatment and prophylaxis would occur 24 hours after
the appearance of symptoms.
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of a seasonal influenza vaccination program in each
pre-pandemic re-vaccination year, although it may not
be possible to achieve high coverage using this strategy. It
was assumed that the average time between pandemics
was 30 years (based on the spacing of the previous 4 in-
fluenza pandemics), so that on average 3 pre-pandemic
vaccines would be developed and deployed for each
pandemic. Sensitivity analyses to both the 10 year vac-
cination renewal period and 30 year pandemic return
period were conducted.
Full (100%) vaccination coverage was assumed as a base-
line value; however since high levels of influenza vaccin-
ation coverage may be difficult to achieve without the
immanent threat of a highly pathogenic pandemic, sensi-
tivity analyses of different levels of vaccination coverage
were conducted. We make no assumption on the rate of
pre-emptive vaccination, other than that a certain level of
coverage (100% for baseline scenarios, 10%-100% for sen-
sitivity analyses) is achieved before the next pandemic
occurs.
Trials of candidate pre-pandemic vaccines for the H5N1
influenza virus have shown seroconversion rates (defined
as having a fourfold neutralizing seroconversion rate)
between 60 and 90 per cent [18,20-22]. However, these pre-
pandemic vaccines may not be closely matched to an emer-
gent influenza strain or may offer only limited cross-strain
protection within the virus subtype, thus an efficacy of 30%
is assumed. For completeness, a high efficacy pre-pandemic
vaccine which closely matches the virus subtype with 75%
efficacy was also considered; a scenario where the pre-
pandemic vaccine was mismatched (having 0% efficacy)
was also considered, in which case we assumed that a vac-
cine would be developed reactively with a 6-month delay
(see below). For individuals aged 65 years or older, we as-
sume that vaccine efficacy will be 80% of the value for those
younger than 65. Thus for our assumed pre-pandemic vac-
cine, we assume a VE of 24% for those 65 years and older,
and a VE of 60% for a well-matched vaccine. A review of
studies examining antibody responses to influenza vaccin-
ation in older individuals found that seroconversion rates
were from 60% to 80% those of younger people, depending
on the influenza strain [50]. In the case of a well matched
vaccine (which we assume as having VE of 75% for younger
people), we assume a VE of 60%, which is consistent with a
trial that found a VE of 58% for ages 60 and older for a
well-matched seasonal vaccine [51].
Reactive vaccination
A two-dose reactive vaccination strategy was also con-
sidered, assuming that individuals are naïve to a future
influenza strain and that a two-dose vaccine is essential
to achieve immunity [22,23]. During the H1N1 2009
pandemic the first supplies of a suitable vaccine became
available after 5–6 months following the appearance of
the new strain of H1N1 influenza. In this study, a
6 months delay from the onset of the pandemic to the
initiation of a vaccine campaign is assumed, after which
the population is vaccinated at a rate of 1% of the popu-
lation per day. As for the pre-emptive vaccination strat-
egy, full vaccination coverage was assumed.
Availability of a highly effective vaccine is assumed: tri-
als of candidate vaccines for the H1N1 2009 pandemic
influenza showed seroconversion rates of vaccines be-
tween 82 and 92 per cent [52]. Recent studies estimated
that the vaccine effectiveness of the H1N1 2009 pan-
demic vaccines was between 72% and 87% [53-55]; vac-
cines with an efficacy of 75% are therefore assumed
(60% in individuals aged 65 years or more).
It was assumed that vaccination was prioritised so that
age groups known to have higher transmission rates
would be vaccinated first. Previous modelling results
have indicated that a transmitters-first vaccination strat-
egy is more effective in reducing both attack and case
fatality rates than a vulnerable-first approach when
timely and wide vaccination coverage is possible [28,56]
(note that the issue of vaccination targeting is addressed
further in the Discussion section).
Vaccination scenarios
The reactive vaccination strategy described above is the
baseline against which pre-emptive vaccination strategies
were compared. Four plausible pre-emptive vaccination
strategies were considered and are defined in Table 1.
In scenario 1 an assumption that no pandemic occurs
in the 30 year time-frame is made. Thus, there is no
pandemic related mortality (and no life years saved), and
the only cost incurred is that of pre-emptive vaccination.
In scenario 2, it is assumed that a pandemic does occur
in the 30 year time-frame, and the emergent pandemic
virus subtype does not match the able pre-pandemic
vaccine with which the population has been vaccinated.
No protection would be conferred by the pre-emptive
vaccine (i.e. a vaccine efficacy of 0%), and it is assumed
that a new reactive vaccine would be developed and
used after a 6-month delay. The effectiveness of this
strategy in saving lives is thus the same as the reactive
vaccination strategy, but the costs are the combined
costs of pre-emptive and reactive vaccination.
In scenario 3 it is assumed that the virus subtype
matches the pre-pandemic vaccine previously used, such
that the vaccine efficacy is 30%.
For completeness, scenario 4 considers a pandemic strain
which happens to be particularly well matched to the pre-
pandemic vaccine, giving a vaccine efficacy of 75%.
Social distancing and antiviral drug interventions
For the reactive vaccination strategy and each of the pre-
emptive vaccination scenarios, three different combinations
Halder et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:266 Page 5 of 19
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/266
of social distancing and antiviral drug-based interventions
were considered. The first is vaccination alone (i.e. with no
additional social distancing or antiviral usage). The second
is a combination of social distancing (school closure
and community contact reduction) and antiviral treat-
ment and prophylaxis, which is assumed to operate for
8 weeks prior to and overlapping with the peak of the
pandemic. The third is the same combination of social
distancing and antiviral usage, except that it is assumed
to continue for a sustained period (until the time when
a reactive vaccination programme would be complete).
Full details of non-vaccination interventions are pre-
sented in Additional file 1.
Antiviral drug and school closure interventions (either
sustained or limited duration) were initiated when spe-
cific threshold numbers of symptomatic individuals were
diagnosed in the community, which triggered health
authorities to activate the intervention response; detailed
analyses of these assumptions were presented in previ-
ous modelling studies [37,38,57].
Community contact reduction was modelled by as-
suming that on days when the intervention was in effect
all individuals made 50% fewer random community con-
tacts. It was assumed that 50% of symptomatic individuals
would be identified for antiviral treatment, that household
members of treated individuals would receive antiviral
prophylaxis, and that treatment and prophylaxis would
occur 24 hours after the appearance of symptoms.
Influenza transmission model
In the simulation model, the location and activity of
each individual in the community is calculated twice per
day – during one of the daily cycles (representing the
night, evening and morning) individuals were assumed
to be at home and made potentially infective contact
with all other member of their household. In the other
daily cycle (representing day-time activities) individuals
were either located in their household, in a workplace,
or in a school classroom, and made contact with a subset
of individuals in the same location; random community-
based contact also occurred during the day cycle. Full
details of the human movement and contact model can be
found in Additional file 1 and also in [15,28].
Infectious transmission occurred when an infectious
and susceptible individual came into contact during a
simulation cycle. Following each contact, a new infection
state for the susceptible individual (either to remain sus-
ceptible or to become infected) was randomly chosen via
a Bernoulli trial [37]. Once infected an individual pro-
gressed through a series of infection states according to
a fixed timeline.
The probability that a susceptible individual would be
become infectious after an infectious contact was calcu-
lated according to the following transmission function,
which takes into account the disease infectivity of the
infectious individual Ii and the susceptibility of suscep-
tible individual Is at the time of contact.
Ptrans Ii; Isð Þ ¼ β Inf Iið Þ  Susc Isð Þ  AVF Ii; Isð Þ
 Vaccine Isð Þ
Each factor contributing to the transmission probability
(underlying transmissibility β, time-varying transmissibility
Inf(Ii), age-based susceptibility Susc(Is), antiviral effect-
iveness AVF(Ii, Is), and vaccine effectiveness Vaccine(Is))
is described in detail in [15,28] and Additional file 1.
The transmission probability coefficient β, capturing the
infectivity of the virus strain, was chosen to give unmiti-
gated epidemics with a specific basic reproduction
number: R0 = 1.9 and 2.7 have been used in this study to
capture transmission characteristics for moderate and
severe influenza pandemics respectively.
Epidemics were initiated by introducing one randomly
located infected seed individual into the population each
day, for the duration of the epidemic. All simulations
were repeated 40 times with random numbers control-
ling the outcome of stochastic events (the locality of
seeded infected individuals and the outcome of infective
contact events) and the results were averaged. Analysis
of this simulation model has shown that the 40-run
mean attack rate is highly unlikely (95% confidence) to
differ by more than 1.2% of the mean attack rate of a
much larger set of experiment repeats. In addition, an
estimation of confidence interval (95% confidence) for
the cost effectiveness ratio for moderate and severe pan-
demics is presented in Additional File 1: Figure A1.3).
For all results we find that the 95% confidence intervals
are much smaller than the reported differences in cost
effectiveness ratios for different strategies.
We used C++ programing language to create individual-
based simulation model and Haskell functional program-
ming for scripting purposes. The data produced by the
simulator were fed into an economical model developed
using MS excel to generate figures and tables.
Health outcomes
In order to calculate costs arising from lost productivity
and from hospitalisation of ill individuals, an estimate of
individual health outcomes (symptomatic illness, hospi-
talisation, ICU admission and death) is required for each
simulated scenario. The number symptomatic illnesses
was calculated from simulation results, which generated
age-specific attack rates for a pandemic with a particular
transmissibility and intervention scenario, assuming that
32% of infections resulted in asymptomatic illness [58].
Pandemic related mortality was then calculated using
the number of simulated symptomatic cases and the
(symptomatic) CFR according to the pandemic severity
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(0.25% for a moderate pandemic and 1.5% for a severe
pandemic). As in prior cost effectiveness studies con-
ducted using this simulation model [15,35-37], H1N1
2009 pandemic data from Western Australia were used to
provide a relationship between the CFR and numbers
requiring hospitalisation and ICU treatment. These data
indicated a non-ICU hospitalisation to fatality ratio of 32:1
and an ICU admission to fatality ratio of 3:1 and align with
those derived by other studies, for example in [59].
Vaccination cost and economic analysis
As with the method presented in previous cost effective-
ness studies using this simulation model [15,39-41], an
economic model was used to translate the health out-
come of each individual in the modelled population, as
derived by the Albany simulation model and the health
outcomes model, into the overall pandemic cost burden.
The approach taken determines the total economic cost
to society incurred during a future influenza pandemic.
Total costs involve both direct healthcare costs (e.g. the
cost of medical attention due to a GP visit, or for hospi-
talisation) and costs due to productivity loss due to ill-
ness and social distancing interventions. Pharmaceutical
costs (i.e. costs related to antiviral drugs and vaccines)
are also estimated. Productivity losses due to death were
not considered in the analyses leading to the main re-
sults of this study, however alternative analyses which
include productivity losses resulting from pandemic
deaths were conducted and these additional results are
presented in Additional file 1.
The calculation of vaccination costs for reactive vac-
cination and pre-emptive vaccination differ from each
other. Reactive vaccines were those which were devel-
oped, produced and deployed once the virus subtype of
an emergent pandemic was identified, and costs associ-
ated with development, manufacture and administration
were a once-off cost. In contrast, pre-pandemic vaccines
were assumed to be manufactured and administered as
an on-going process, with an annual recurrent cost. It
was assumed that the pre-pandemic vaccine would be
updated every ten years, to ensure that it would reflect
the most likely new emergent strain. For each pre-
pandemic vaccine developed, it was assumed that the
whole population would be vaccinated in the year of de-
velopment, and that each year thereafter full coverage
would be maintained by vaccinating infants (according
to the average Australian birth rate). Conservative alter-
nate assumptions that pre-pandemic vaccines would
need to be updated and deployed more often (e.g. every
5 or 7 years) were examined in a sensitivity analysis.
All costs are reported in 2012 US dollars using con-
sumer price index adjustments. 2012 US dollar values
are used to make the results readily convertible to a wide
range of developed countries. A full description of the
economic analysis, including cost data used in establish-
ing the overall cost of each pandemic scenario is given
in Additional file 1. All future costs and life years were
discounted at 3% annually [60]. The time horizon for
this analysis is the period up to and including the next
influenza pandemic, which was assumed to be on aver-
age 30 years based on the spacing of the previous 4
influenza pandemics.
Cost effectiveness
The cost effectiveness of a given intervention strategy is
presented in terms of cost per Life Years Saved (LYS).
The numerator used in this cost effectiveness ratio was
derived from the total cost arising from a given interven-
tion being applied to the whole community. The denom-
inator was calculated as the difference between years of
life lost for an unmitigated pandemic and a pandemic
with the intervention applied. Years of life lost data were
derived for each simulation from the ages and life ex-
pectancies of the individuals who died as a result of the
pandemic.
The cost effectiveness of each intervention is presented
as a cost in dollars ($) per LYS per person. This was de-
rived by establishing the total cost for a particular inter-
vention strategy and then dividing it by the population of
the Albany model, approximately 30,000 individuals, so




Assuming that an influenza pandemic occurs every 30 years
on average, and that pre-pandemic vaccines are at least
30% effective, a pre-emptive vaccination strategy is more
effective, less costly, and more cost effective in terms of cost
per life year saved than a reactive vaccination strategy, for
all severities and combinations of interventions simulated
in this study.
Conversely, if the pre-pandemic vaccines developed
are ineffective (failing to provide protection due to strain
mismatch), the policy of pre-emptive vaccination is less
cost effective than the reactive vaccination strategy, since
we assume that a reactive vaccine will also be developed
and deployed under these circumstances.
The use of social distancing (SD) and antiviral (AV) in-
terventions in addition to either reactive or pre-emptive
vaccination is always more effective than the vaccination
alone. The cost effectiveness of combining additional SD
and AV with vaccination depends on the efficacy of pre-
pandemic vaccines, the duration of social distancing,
and the severity of pandemics.
In the following sections we examine the relative effect-
iveness, total cost and cost effectiveness of pre-emptive
and reactive vaccination for all four pandemic scenarios.
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Since the actual scenario that will occur in a future pan-
demic is uncertain, we then examine the sensitivity of the
relative cost effectiveness of pre-emptive and reactive vac-
cination policies to key assumptions.
The main outcomes of this study, namely the effective-
ness (LYS), the total cost, and cost effectiveness as the
cost per life year saved ratio of each pre-emptive and re-
active vaccination strategy, with and without social dis-
tancing and antiviral interventions, for each modelled
scenario, and for both moderate and severe pandemics
are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively. An esti-
mation of confidence interval for the cost effectiveness
ratio for moderate and severe pandemics for scenario 2
is presented in Additional File 1. Figure 2 presents a cost
effectiveness plane for scenario 2, scenario 3 and sce-
nario 4, which plots each vaccination strategy with and
without social distancing and antiviral interventions
horizontally according to the costs (compared to no
intervention), and vertically according to the effective-
ness (life years saved per 10,000 population). Figure 3
presents cost breakdown of different cost components
such as health care cost, social distancing and illness
cost, antiviral cost and vaccination cost for all simulated
pandemic scenarios and interventions.
Table 2 Effectiveness (Life years saved per 10,000) of vaccination strategies for moderate pandemics
(R = 1.9 and CFR = 0.25%) and severe pandemics (R = 2.7 and CFR = 1.5%)
Moderate pandemics (R = 1.9 and CFR = 0.25%)
Scenarios SD and AV intervention Life years saved (LYS) per 10,000 population
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 1: no pandemic none - -
Pre-emptive + Reactive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 2: pandemic with virus which does not match
pre-emptive vaccine i.e. vaccine efficacy of 0%
none 4* 4*
8 weeks SD + AV 253 253
Sustained SD + AV 421 421
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 3: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 30%
none 312 4*
8 weeks SD + AV 415 253
Sustained SD + AV 429 421
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 4: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 75%
none 453 4*
8 weeks SD + AV 460 253
Sustained SD + AV 462 421
Extreme pandemics (R = 2.7 and CFR = 1.5%)
Scenarios SD and AV intervention Total cost ($) per 10,000 population
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 1: no pandemic none - -
Pre-emptive + Reactive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 2: pandemic with virus which does not match
pre-emptive vaccine i.e. vaccine efficacy of 0%
none 9* 9*
8 weeks SD + AV 1,219 1,219
Sustained SD + AV 2,720 2,720
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 3: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 30%
none 1,680 9*
8 weeks SD + AV 2,719 1,219
Sustained SD + AV 3,134 2,720
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 4: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 75%
none 3,499 9*
8 weeks SD + AV 3,507 1,219
Sustained SD + AV 3,510 2,720
*indicates life years saved (LYS) value not statistically significantly different from zero due to stochastic simulation variation.
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Reactive vaccination
A comprehensive cost effectiveness analysis of reactive
vaccination including 6 months of development delay has
been conducted in [15]. Reactive vaccination alone is an
ineffective strategy in saving lives and not cost effective
(see Tables 2 and 4, reactive vaccination column and
Figure 2), since vaccination occurs well after the pandemic
peak and has essentially no effect. The addition of at least
8 weeks social distancing and antiviral interventions to the
reactive vaccination greatly increases effectiveness and
cost effectiveness (see Tables 2 and 4). Sustained SD plus
AV further improve effectiveness and cost effectiveness for
both moderate and severe pandemics (see Tables 2 and 4,
reactive vaccination). For severe pandemics, the addition
Table 3 Total cost of vaccination strategies for moderate pandemics (R = 1.9 and CFR = 0.25%) and severe pandemics
(R = 2.7 and CFR = 1.5%)
Moderate pandemics (R = 1.9 and CFR = 0.25%)
Scenarios SD and AV intervention Total cost ($) per 10,000 population
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 1: no pandemic none $2,430,000 $0
Pre-emptive + Reactive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 2: pandemic with virus which does not match
pre-emptive vaccine i.e. vaccine efficacy of 0%
none $6,510,000 $4,080,000
8 weeks SD + AV $7,510,000 $5,080,000
Sustained SD + AV $10,460,000 $8,030,000
Unmitigated pandemic cost (no intervention) $3,200,000
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 3: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 30%
none $4,250,000 $4,080,000
8 weeks SD + AV $5,020,000 $5,080,000
Sustained SD + AV $6,820,000 $8,030,000
Unmitigated pandemic cost (no intervention) $3,200,000
Pre-emptive Vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 4: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 75%
none $3,630,000 $4,080,000
8 weeks SD + AV $4,800,000 $5,080,000
Sustained SD + AV $6,310,000 $8,030,000
Unmitigated pandemic cost (no intervention) $3,200,000
Extreme pandemics (R = 2.7 and CFR = 1.5%)
Scenarios SD and AV intervention Total cost ($) per 10,000 population
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 1: no pandemic none $2,430,000 $0
Pre-emptive + Reactive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 2: pandemic with virus which does not match
pre-emptive vaccine i.e. vaccine efficacy of 0%
none $17,480,000 $15,050,000
8 weeks SD + AV $15,000,000 $12,570,000
Sustained SD + AV $13,430,000 $11,000,000
Unmitigated pandemic cost (no intervention) $14,180,000
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 3: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 30%
none $10,190,000 $15,050,000
8 weeks SD + AV $8,420,000 $12,570,000
Sustained SD + AV $8,810,000 $11,000,000
Unmitigated pandemic cost (no intervention) $14,180,000
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 4: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 75%
none $3,760,000 $15,050,000
8 weeks SD + AV $5,100,000 $12,570,000
Sustained SD + AV $6,970,000 $11,000,000
Unmitigated pandemic cost (no intervention) $14,180,000
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of sustained SD and AV to reactive vaccination improves
the relative cost effectiveness by decreasing total pandemic
costs and increasing the number of life year saved. For
moderate pandemics, it is the most cost effective strategy
but it also increases the total pandemic costs (see Tables 3
and 4, reactive vaccination).
Scenario 1: no pandemic occurs
One of the main assumptions of this study is that a fu-
ture pandemic will occur in a 30 year time frame. If no
pandemic occurs, obviously there is no need for reactive
vaccines. Therefore, reactive vaccination policy where no
vaccine is actually developed costs nothing, while the
pre-emptive vaccination policy that costs approximately
$2.5 million per 10,000 population (see Table 3 – sce-
nario 1). This scenario is has been included essentially to
quantify the direct cost incurred by pre-emptive vac-
cination. Note that in this scenario cost effectiveness is
undefined, as no lives are lost due to the pandemic or
saved due to interventions.
Scenario 2: pandemic virus strain does not match pre-
pandemic vaccines i.e. vaccine efficacy of 0%
In this scenario, it was assumed that the ineffectiveness
of the pre-pandemic vaccine would be quickly recog-
nised, and a reactive vaccine would be developed and
Table 4 Cost effectiveness (cost per life years saved) of vaccination strategies for moderate pandemics
(R = 1.9 and CFR = 0.25%) and severe pandemics (R = 2.7 and CFR = 1.5%)
Moderate pandemics (R = 1.9 and CFR = 0.25%)
Scenarios SD and AV intervention Cost ($) per LYS
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 1: no pandemic occurs none - -
Pre-emptive + Reactive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 2: pandemic with virus which does not match
pre-emptive vaccine i.e. vaccine efficacy of 0%
none $1,627,500 $1,020,000
8 weeks SD + AV $29,684 $20,079
Sustained SD + AV $24,846 $19,074
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 3: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 30%
none $13,622 $1,020,000
8 weeks SD + AV $12,096 $20,079
Sustained SD + AV $15,897 $19,074
Pre-emptivevaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 4: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 75%
none $8,013 $1,020,000
8 weeks SD + AV $10,435 $20,079
Sustained SD + AV $13,658 $19,074
Extreme pandemics (R = 2.7 and CFR = 1.5%)
Scenarios SD and AV intervention Cost ($) per LYS
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 1: no pandemic occurs none - -
Pre-emptive + Reactive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 2: pandemic with virus which does not match
pre-emptive vaccine i.e. vaccine efficacy of 0%
none $1,942,222 $1,672,222
8 weeks SD + AV $12,305 $10,312
Sustained SD + AV $4,938 $4,044
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 3: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 30%
none $6,066 $1,672,222
8 weeks SD + AV $3,097 $10,312
Sustained SD + AV $2,811 $4,044
Pre-emptive vaccination Reactive vaccination
Scenario 4: pandemic with virus which matches
pre-emptive vaccine with efficacy of 75%
one $1,075 $1,672,222
8 weeks SD + AV $1,454 $10,312
Sustained SD + AV $1,986 $4,044
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deployed to mitigate the effect of the pandemics. The
effectiveness and cost effectiveness results, for both
moderate and severe pandemics, are as for the reactive
strategy, except that under the pre-emptive vaccination
policy the additional cost of the pre-pandemic vaccine
is paid, making the pre-emptive policy less cost effect-
ive (see Tables 2, 3 and 4 for scenario 2). For example,
the relative cost effectiveness ratio of the pre-emptive
policy is approximately $25,000/LYS whereas $19,000/
LYS for the reactive policy, for moderate pandemics
(see Table 4 for scenario 2). Although these results are
unsurprising, quantification of the additional cost of
having to develop and use both vaccines allows us to
determine how the cost-effectiveness of a pre-emptive
vaccination policy degrades with increasing probability
of vaccine failure.
Figure 2 Cost effectiveness plane for intervention strategies for different scenarios. Intervention strategies are labelled as R: Reactive
vaccination, P: Pre-emptive vaccination, R + LSD: Reactive vaccination + Limited Social Distancing (8 weeks of SC + CCR) + AV, P + LSD: Pre-emptive
vaccination + Limited Social Distancing + AV, R + SSD: Reactive vaccination + Sustained Social Distancing (Sustained SC + CCR) + AV, P + SSD:
Pre-emptive vaccination + Sustained Social Distancing + AV, SC – School Closure, CCR – Community Contact Reduction, AV – Antiviral treatment
for cases and prophylaxis for their household members, LSD – Limited Social Distancing, SSD – Sustained Social Distancing. All LSD and SSD
interventions integrate the use of antivirals (AV).
Figure 3 Cost breakdowns to different costing components. Interventions strategies are labelled as Figure 2.
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Scenario 3: pre-pandemic vaccine matches pandemic
virus with efficacy of 30%
Moderate pandemics
For moderate pandemics, the results suggested that pre-
emptive vaccination strategies with or without social dis-
tancing and antivirals were more effective, less costly
and more cost effective compared to their reactive vac-
cination counterparts (see Tables 2, 3, 4 and Figure 2 –
centre panel, green-diamond and green-cross). This is
because for moderate pandemics, the cohort of immune
individuals created by vaccination reduces the effective
reproduction of the pandemic and allows limited dur-
ation social distancing and antiviral measures to be
highly effective.
The most cost effective strategy was pre-emptive vac-
cination coupled with 8 weeks SD plus AV. This resulted
the cost effectiveness ratio of $12,000 per LYS while sav-
ing approximately 415 life years per 10,000 population,
whereas the reactive counterpart resulted $20,000 per
LYS while saving approximately 253 life years per 10,000
population (see Table 4 for moderate pandemics). The
most effective strategy was the pre-emptive vaccination
combined with sustained SD plus AV, which saved
approximately 430 life years per 10,000 population. This
was the most costly pre-emptive strategy however, cost-
ing approximately $6.8 million per 10,000 population,
because its sustained social distancing interventions
incurred additional costs (see Figure 3 – centre panel,
moderate pandemics) while saving relatively few add-
itional lives.
Severe pandemics
For severe pandemics, the results indicated that the
most effective and cost effective strategies included pre-
emptive vaccination combined with sustained SD plus
AV. This strategy is shown in Tables 2, 4 and Figure 2 –
centre panel (labelled as P + SSD red-diamond for severe
pandemics).
This strategy was highly cost effective due to the fact
that with a high CFR, prevention of infection translated
into prevented hospitalisation, ICU usage and death. Thus,
all interventions reduced both life years lost and costs,
rendering tem highly cost effective. This can be seen in
Figure 3 – scenario 3 for severe pandemics, which pre-
sents the break-down of cost components for each inter-
vention strategy and scenario. Due to this combined
effect, this strategy could save approximately 3100 life
years per 10,000 population, which was the highest num-
ber of life years saved, and cost approximately $2,800 per
LYS, which was the lowest cost effectiveness ratio among
the modelled interventions (see Tables 2 and 4).
The next most cost effective strategy was that which
combined pre-emptive vaccination with 8 weeks SD plus
AV (see Table 4 and Figure 2 centre panel – P + LSD red
diamond). When compared to the reactive counterpart,
the combined pre-emptive vaccination with 8 weeks SD
plus AV is approximately 55% more effective and approxi-
mately 30% less costly (see Tables 2 and 3 for scenario 3).
This is explained by the fact that in the case of the reactive
vaccination policy the pandemic resurges once social dis-
tancing interventions are relaxed, whereas the usage of
pre-pandemic vaccines creates a significant proportion of
immune individuals which prevents the pandemic resur-
gence, resulting in a significant reduction in mortality and
total cost.
Scenario 4: pre-pandemic vaccine matches pandemic
virus with efficacy of 75%
Moderate pandemics
Under this scenario, the pre-emptive vaccination policy
was highly effective and cost effective compared to the
reactive vaccination policy. The most cost effective strat-
egy was purely pre-emptive vaccination, resulting a cost
per life year saved ratio of $8000. The addition of social
distancing and antivirals incurred total costs resulting in
$10,400/LYS for 8 weeks social distancing plus antivirals
and $13,700/LYS for the sustained social distancing plus
antivirals respectively. The additional social distancing and
antiviral costs of these combined strategies incurs prod-
uctivity losses due to social distancing interventions, with-
out preventing many further symptomatic infections or
deaths. This is apparent in Figure 3 – right panel, which
shows the cost breakdown of different cost components.
For severe pandemics, the results for scenario 4 follow
the same pattern as for moderate pandemics, but are
more pronounced, since the highly effective intervention
saves both lives and cost.
Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analyses were conducted for key model param-
eters to determine how alternative assumptions about pre-
emptive vaccination affected the relative cost effectiveness
pre-emptive and reactive vaccination strategies.
We specifically examined pre-emptive vaccination cover-
age, the time between pre-pandemic vaccine renewals, the
expected time between pandemics and the chance of pre-
pandemic vaccine mismatch. Significant findings are sum-
marised below. We further performed sensitivity analyses
for lower/higher weekly wages found in EU [61] and in-
cluding/excluding productivity losses due to illness. These
sensitivity analyses are presented in Additional File 1. Fur-
ther sensitivity analysis of key parameters related to reactive
vaccination can be found in details in the supplementary in-
formation of [15].
Vaccination coverage
We assume that for a moderate or severe pandemic,
having a CFR of 0.25% or greater, 100% or near 100%
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coverage is plausible for a reactive vaccination strategy.
For pre-emptive vaccination, where there is no deadly
pandemic underway to focus the attention of the public, it
may not be possible to achieve a high level of vaccination
coverage. We therefore extended our cost effectiveness
analysis to vary pre-emptive vaccination coverage from
10% to 100%, for all scenarios and interventions consid-
ered in this study (see Figure 4).
For moderate pandemics, pre-emptive vaccination with
20% coverage coupled with 8 weeks social distancing and
antiviral interventions resulted in better cost effectiveness
than the most cost effective reactive vaccination strategy;
achieving 50% pre-emptive vaccination coverage was suffi-
cient for near optimal (within 10%) cost effectiveness (see
Figure 4 – left panel).
For severe pandemics, pre-emptive vaccination with at
least 30% coverage together with sustained social distan-
cing and antivirals resulted in better cost effectiveness
than the most cost effective reactive vaccination strategy,
and 60% pre-emptive vaccination coverage was near op-
timal cost effectiveness (see Figure 4 – right panel).
Vaccine renewal frequency
Depending on the rate of emergence of new potential pan-
demic virus strains and the degree of cross-strain reactivity
that can be achieved with a pre-emptive vaccine, vaccines
may have to be renewed more frequently than the 10 year
baseline value assumed in the main results. We alterna-
tively assumed that the pre-pandemic vaccine would be
renewed every 7 or 5 years, incurring new vaccine develop-
ment and administration costs. The analyses suggested that
more frequent renewal makes pre-emptive vaccination less
cost effective; however for both moderate and severe pan-
demics the most cost effective strategy is still pre-emptive
vaccination coupled social distancing, even if vaccine re-
newal time is reduced to 5 years (see Figure 5).
Pandemic frequency
If pandemics occurred at a lower rate than the average
of one every 30 years assumed in the main results, pre-
emptive vaccination would become less cost effective,
since the pre-emptive vaccine renewal program would
result in more vaccines being developed per pandemic.
We examined the sensitivity of the results to pandemic
frequency by calculating costs and cost effectiveness
assuming average time between pandemics ranging from
10 to 100 years (see Figure 6). It was found that pre-
emptive vaccination (coupled with social distancing)
remained the most cost-effective strategy for pandemic
return times up to 80 years.
Pre-pandemic vaccine mismatch
The vaccine effectiveness of a pre-pandemic vaccine is a
major unknown: we have examined three scenarios of
0%, 30% and 75% effectiveness. However without prob-
abilities attached to these scenarios, a quantitative as-
sessment of cost-effectiveness in the face of uncertainty
cannot be made. We conducted a simple analysis by
assuming that VE would be 0% effective with some
probability p, and 30% effective with probability (1-p). In
other words, there is a probability of p of complete vac-
cine failure. Figure 7 shows the expected (in the tech-
nical sense) cost effectiveness as a function of p. This
shows that the most cost effective pre-emptive vaccin-
ation strategy (including social distancing and antivirals)
remains more cost effective than reactive strategies with
a vaccine failure probability of 40% or lower.
Discussion
The possible emergence of a highly pathogenic influenza
pandemic presents a challenge to public health planning.
Vaccination with an effective vaccine is an ideal solution;
however such a vaccine would take at least 6 months
to develop, test, produce and distribute with current
proven techniques, by which time the pandemic is likely
to have reached most parts of the world. Antiviral neur-
aminidase drugs and social distancing measures of suffi-
cient rigor would be capable of supressing transmission,
however these could be extremely expensive and pos-
sibly unsustainable [15,29,40,62].
A pre-pandemic vaccine, developed to provide cross-
clade protection and administered prior to the pandemic,
has the potential to address this problem. However this
strategy comes with its own challenges: it is not certain
what degree of vaccine efficacy that can be achieved
against an unknown future influenza strain, it may be diffi-
cult to achieve high levels of vaccination coverage, the
pre-pandemic would need to be periodically renewed and
re-administered.
This modelling study has compared the relative effect-
iveness and cost effectiveness of reactive and pre-emptive
vaccination strategies. In order to make a meaningful
comparison, both strategies have been made as plausible
as possible: the reactive strategy assumes a six month
delay to vaccine availability; and the pre-emptive strategy
assumes a lower vaccine efficacy and ongoing vaccine
renewal costs. All other assumptions that are not related
to vaccination have been kept the same for both vaccin-
ation policies, including the inclusion of various combina-
tions social distancing and antiviral measures.
For moderate and severe influenza pandemics a policy
of pre-pandemic vaccination combined with social dis-
tancing and antiviral interventions was found to be more
effective and cost effective than a policy of reactive vac-
cination, provided that at least 30% of the population
can be pre-vaccinated. While a pre-pandemic vaccine is
presumed to have a lower efficacy than a matched reactive
vaccine, pre-vaccination creates a cohort of individuals
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who are immune at the start of the pandemics. For
moderate pandemics this reduces the effective repro-
duction of the pandemic and allows limited duration
social distancing and antiviral measures to be highly
effective. For severe pandemics, the infection avoided
by pre-vaccination reduces both the number of lives
lost and, due to avoided medical costs, the total cost of
the pandemic.
The most effective and cost effective strategies for
both reactive and pre-emptive vaccination involved the
combination of vaccination with social distancing and
antiviral measures. For reactive vaccination, sustained
social distancing and antiviral measures (lasting for
6 months) was always most cost effective, since without
some early intervention the pandemic peaked and sub-
sided prior to the vaccination programme.
For pre-emptive vaccination the optimally cost-effective
duration of social distancing depended on the pandemic
severity: for severe pandemics sustained social distancing
was the most cost effective, while for moderate pandemics
8 weeks of social distancing was more cost effective than
sustained social distancing. In this case the presence of
Figure 4 Impact of vaccination coverage on the cost effectiveness. Interventions strategies are labelled as Figure 2.
Figure 5 Impact of vaccine renewal frequency on the cost effectiveness. Interventions strategies are labelled as Figure 2.
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immune individuals, and the use of optimally timed [38]
social distancing for 2 months was highly effective at redu-
cing attack rate and mortality, to such a degree that add-
itional months of social distancing did not significantly
further reduce the attack rate.
If it transpired that the pre-pandemic vaccine was highly
effective (VE 70%), the cohort of immune individuals was
sufficient to prevent the pandemic, and pre-vaccination
alone was then highly cost effective.
Sensitivity analysis
Pre-emptive vaccination is an untried strategy, and while
we have chosen plausible parameter values to represent
this strategy in our model, it is possible that there are
Figure 6 Impact of pandemic frequency on the cost effectiveness. Interventions strategies are labelled as Figure 2.
Figure 7 Impact of pre-pandemic vaccine mismatch on the cost effectiveness. Interventions strategies are labelled as Figure 2.
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other plausible assumptions that might lead to a differ-
ent assessment of cost effectiveness. In fact, our sensitiv-
ity analysis indicates that the results are quite robust to
variation in the most important of these assumptions.
Unlike a reactive vaccination program, which we as-
sume will be able to achieve high vaccination coverage
during a highly pathogenic pandemic, it is possible that
vaccination coverage of a pre-pandemic vaccination
programme will not be able to achieve high levels of
coverage. We found that pre-emptive strategies remained
more cost effective compared to corresponding reactive
strategies for pre-emptive vaccination coverage levels
down to 30% (while reactive strategies remain at 100%
coverage). Pre-vaccination also remained more cost-
effective than reactive vaccination if pandemics were
assumed to occur on average every 80 years, rather than
the baseline assumption of 30 years; or if pandemic vac-
cines needed to be renewed every 5 years rather than
the baseline assumption of every decade. Our sensitivity
analysis also showed that if a policy of pre-emptive vac-
cination is backed up by reactive vaccination in the case
of pre-pandemic vaccine failure (i.e. our scenario 2
results), the pre-emptive policy can tolerate a vaccine
failure rate of 30% and remain competitive with a
reactive-only policy.
Our economic analysis was conducted from a societal
perspective, and includes costs due to productivity
losses stemming from illness and social distancing in-
terventions. Analysing the results from a health-care
provider perspective and omitting these costs, we find
that the most cost effective strategy as judged by the
lowest cost per LYS ratio remains the same (results
shown in Additional File 1).
As with all modelling studies, the numerical results
presented in this study depend on assumptions and
model parameters which are not known exactly. However,
the results and trends discussed highlight the relative cost
effectiveness of alternative intervention strategies – in this
case, pre-emptive versus reactive vaccination strategies –
that differ only on intervention parameters, and for which
all the other model parameters are the same. These results
should be robust to plausible variations in other model
parameter values, as such variations in model parameter
values will influence both simulation outcomes same way.
Related research
Reactive vaccination strategies including vaccine devel-
opment and deployment delay has been well studied in
[15,16,32,35]. However, while no studies to our know-
ledge have explicitly compared the cost effectiveness
of pre-emptive and delayed reactive strategies, several
studies have considered strategies involving vaccin-
ation prior to or at the beginning of a pandemic with a
vaccine of limited efficacy.
The study of Newall et al. [31] explicitly modelled
pharmaceutical interventions for a severe pandemic,
explicitly taking into account a 6-month delay before the
use of a matched vaccine. This included scenarios where
a lower efficacy stockpiled pre-pandemic vaccine was
used at the beginning of the pandemic in addition to a
matched vaccine after the delay. Although differences in
assumptions mean that the study of Newall et al. is not
directly comparable to the current study, it did show that
sufficient coverage with a low-efficacy pre-pandemic
vaccine could effectively mitigate the impact of a severe
pandemic, and like the current study it concluded that
cost effectiveness depended upon pandemic severity,
pandemic frequency, vaccination coverage, and prob-
ability of pre-pandemic vaccine strain mismatch.
Several studies have included pre-vaccination in a
cost-effectiveness analysis of pandemic influenza inter-
ventions [16,29,30,34]. While these studies did not com-
pare pre-vaccination to vaccination strategies with a
high-efficacy vaccine and a long delay, they did consider
the use of limited efficacy vaccines at the beginning of a
pandemic. Each of these studies found that with suffi-
cient coverage, which depended upon vaccine efficacy
and the use complementary social distancing and anti-
viral measures, limited efficacy vaccines could cost-
effectively mitigate a pandemic.
Limitations and further research
We recognise a number of limitations of the current
study that suggest avenues for further research. While
our univariate sensitivity analyses examined the effect of
key unknowns, a probabilistic analysis could estimate
cost-effectiveness while taking into account all plausible
combination of unknowns. Such a multivariate analysis
should define a (joint) probability distribution over pan-
demic transmissibility and severity, pandemic frequency,
pre-pandemic vaccine efficacy, and actual vaccination
coverage achieved; the expected effectiveness and cost
effectiveness of intervention strategies could then be
estimated by sampling from this distribution.
We have assumed that pre-pandemic vaccination
would occur prior to a pandemic, perhaps by the inclu-
sion of a pre-pandemic vaccine in a seasonal influenza
vaccine. As noted previously, it may be difficult to
achieve high levels of coverage in this way, given the
relatively low uptake of influenza vaccines [63]. An alter-
native strategy might be to manufacture and keep a large
stockpile of pre-pandemic vaccine, and to vaccinate at
the appearance of a highly pathogenic pandemic. This
may enable higher vaccination coverage, but would incur
additional costs as vaccines would have to be stored and
continually renewed due to limited shelf life. This strategy
has been assessed in [30,34,64], but performing this ana-
lysis in the framework of the current study would allow a
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pre-pandemic stockpiled strategy it to be compared to the
pre-emptive and reactive strategies.
The current study focuses on using mass vaccination to
achieve a population-level reduction in transmission, with
consequent reduction in attack rates, serious illness and
death. As such we have assumed that when less than 100%
vaccine coverage occurs, a transmitters-first strategy is
adopted were vaccine is targeted towards those age groups
most responsible for transmission (children and young
adults). Previous modelling studies have indicated that an
alternative vulnerable first strategy targeting groups at risk
of serious illness and death due to influenza can be more
cost-effective than the transmitters first strategy if vaccin-
ation is delayed relative to the start of the pandemic
[28,35,56]. Since our reactive strategy is delayed, this might
seem to indicate that we should simulate vulnerable-first.
However our reactive strategy incorporates additional non-
vaccination interventions during the delay period which
slow or arrest pandemic spread, which is not the case in
the other studies examining delayed vaccination. Since our
previous study addressing the combination of delayed vac-
cination and additional interim measures showed that
transmitters first vaccination was effective, we have retained
this assumption in the current study [15]. We also note that
the optimal choice between a transmitters-first and vulner-
able-first can also depend upon population demographics
and the presence of pre-existing immunity [35].
We have considered influenza pandemics of severity
category 2 and up on the CDC scale (i.e. with CFR >
=0.25%). This corresponds to the 1918, 1956, and 1968
pandemics, but not the 2009 pandemic. This focus was
motivated by previous studies that indicated that react-
ive vaccination was unlikely to be cost effective [15,31].
Finally, the demographic, economic and health care
assumptions of our simulation model are based on
Australian population characteristics. However, the re-
sults of the studies that use our simulation model [36]
are consistent with a variety of other individual-based
simulation models at a variety of scales (e.g. small com-
munity [65-67], country [68,69]), in as far as comparable
pandemics and intervention strategies are being evalu-
ated. We thus believe that the model is broadly repre-
sentative of developed world cities: sensitivity analyses
included in this study showed that the total cost of
a pandemic varies directly with income levels, since
illness-related productivity losses make up a substantial
part of the pandemic cost, but that the pattern of rela-
tive cost/LYS ratio between strategies is insensitive to a
wide range of income levels.
Conclusion
This study has quantified the effectiveness and cost
effectiveness of plausible and comparable pre-emptive
and reactive vaccination strategies, with and without
accompanying social distancing and antiviral interven-
tions. We found that provided a sufficient level of vac-
cination coverage can be achieved (approximately 30%
in the case of a severe pandemic), pre-pandemic vaccin-
ation strategies have the potential to be more effective
and cost-effective and reactive strategies where a vaccine
is developed and deployed after the start of a pandemic.
One clear risk of a pre-pandemic strategy is that if a
future pandemic were to be of a subtype completely
mismatched with respect to the pre-pandemic vaccine,
the upfront cost of development and production of the
pre-pandemic vaccine would be wasted. However, if the
probability of vaccine failure can be kept sufficiently
low, a policy of pre-vaccination with back-up reactive
vaccination in case of vaccine failure can still be more
cost-effective than a policy of reactive vaccination alone.
Our analysis includes the assumption that pre-pandemic
vaccines would be continually renewed in order to track
the strains most likely to present a pandemic influenza
threat.
Another key finding is that non-vaccination interven-
tions, including antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, and
social distancing measures such as school closure, are
complementary to vaccination, improving the effective-
ness and cost effectiveness of both pre-emptive and
reactive vaccination.
Reactive vaccination strategies exist which are as
effective at mortality reduction as pre-emptive strat-
egies, though less cost effective. However these strat-
egies require vaccination to be preceded by the use of
rigorous social distancing interventions, including strict
school closure and community contact reduction, and this
would need to be sustained for many months, resulting in
a high economic cost and great social disruption.
Additional file
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